Wars Between India and Pakistan--- kargil 1999

Wars Between India and Pakistan--- kargil 1999

When the firing started in 1999, it was difficult to tell if it was a war, and whether India and Pakistan were at war at all. Certainly, Indian soldiers were in the firing line from the outset and the battle was in Indian territory, but the Pakistan Government initially maintained that Indian troops were fighting an internal battle against separatists. Later, as the battle progressed and the coffins started appearing in Pakistan in large numbers, it was difficult for the Pakistan military to deny its involvement. As the last pockets of Pakistani soldiers were mopped up the Pakistan government sought a face saving solution to convert the rout into a semblance of a withdrawal.
It is necessary to look at a map to understand the Kargil conflict. The orange line marks the international border between India and Pakistan, with Pakistan in the north.. On the Indian side of the border (south) gentle slopes give way to mountains towering up to 18,000 feet. Further south of these mountains, and on their foothills lie the Indian towns of Kargil and Drass, and an important Indian highway (Srinagar-Leh highway, National Highway (NH) 1A).
The Pakistan side of the border is easily surveyed from the mountains on the Indian side, but that surveillance was patchy at best. Thus shielded from prying Indian eyes the Pakistan army put into place a brilliant but short-sighted plan to recapture Kashmir. For many years (from the mid-1980s, according to some accounts) Pakistani troops dressed as civilians (as in 1965) crossed the border, climbed the gentle slopes up to the mountains north of Kargil and gradually built up supply routes and fortifications in the mountains within the Indian border. It is clear that the Pakistani incursions were greatly aided by a naive lack of concern on the part of the Indian intelligence set up for what may be happening in this hostile mountainous area - said to be "traditionally not an area for infiltration". Having got well entrenched in the areas shaded yellow in the map, Pakistani forces were able to monitor traffic on India's NH1A, direct accurate artillery fire on it and on other targets and get themselves into position to cut off the highway. It is arguable whether that act would have cut off Northern Kashmir from India - as other routes exist, but Pakistan certainly had the areas marked yellow in the map firmly under its control.
After a belated political realization of the extent of the problem the Indian armed forces were handed the task of literally fighting an uphill battle against a well entrenched and well supplied enemy in hostile terrain. Once again the Indian armed forces showed considerable resilience and innovation. Traditional artillery pieces were changed from their usual role of lobbing shells over mountains to a direct fire mode-targeting line-of sight Pakistani bunkers and supply dumps. In an act that was probably not anticipated by Pakistan - the Indian Air Force was brought in, and once again innovation was applied to achieve pinpoint accuracy in high altitude bombardment of mountaintop targets in conditions that no other air force in the world has been asked to perform. A newly empowered media savvy Indian public and the media aided mobilization of resources and watched India's first televised war as territory was recaptured peak by peak. A beleagured Pakistani Prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, expecting his country to be invaded (mistakenly as it turned out) rushed to the US to try and work out a belated admission of Pakistani involvement and a withdrawal. By the time he returned to face an angry population the rout was complete, and the territorial advantage that Pakistan had painstakingly built up through years of benign Indian neglect was wiped out.

Wars Between India and Pakistan--- 1965 War

Wars Between India and Pakistan--- 1965 War

Wars Between India and Pakistan--- 1965 War

Wars Between India and Pakistan--- 1965 War

The Indo-Pakistani conflict (1965) was also fought over Kashmir and started without a formal declaration of war. The war began in August 5, 1965 and was ended Sept 22, 1965.
The war was initiated by Pakistan who since the defeat of India by China in 1962 had come to believe that Indian military would be unable or unwilling to defend against a quick military campaign in Kashmir, and because the Pakistani government was becoming increasingly alarmed by Indian efforts to integrate Kashmir within India. There was also a perception that there was widespread popular support within for Pakistani rule and that the Kashmiri people were disatisfied with Indian rule.
After Pakistan was successful in the Rann of Kutch earlier in 1965, Ayub Khan (by nature a cautious person) was pressured by the hawks in his cabinet (led by Z.A. Bhutto) and the army to infiltrate the ceasefire line in Kashmir. The action was based on the incorrect premise that indigenous resistance could be ignited by a few saboteurs. Ayub resisted the idea as he foresaw India crossing the international frontier in retaliation at a point of its choosing. The Bhutto faction, which included some prominent generals, put out the canard that Ayub's cowardice stemmed from his desire to protect his newly acquired wealth. It was boasted at the time that one Pakistani soldier was equal to four Indian soldiers and so on.
On August 5, 1965 between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire line on August 15.
The initial battles between India and Pakistan were contained within Kashmir involving both infantry and armor units with each country's air force playing major roles. It was not until early Sept. when Pakistani forces attacked Ackhnur that the Indians escalated the conflict by attacking targets within Pakistan itself, forcing the Pakistani forces to disengage from Ackhnur to counter Indian attacks.
The largest engagement of the war occurred in the Sialkot region where some 400 to 600 tanks squared off. Unfortunately the battle was indecisive.
By Sept 22 both sides had agreed to a UN mandated cease-fire ending the war that had by that point reached a stalemate.
Overall, the war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy--on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.
Pakistan was rudely shocked by the reaction of the United States to the war. Judging the matter to be largely Pakistan s fault, the United States not only refused to come to Pakistan s aid under the terms of the Agreement of Cooperation, but issued a statement declaring its neutrality while also cutting off military supplies. The Pakistanis were embittered at what they considered a friend's betrayal, and the experience taught them to avoid relying on any single source of support. For its part, the United States was disillusioned by a war in which both sides used United States-supplied equipment. The war brought other repercussions for the security relationship as well. The United States withdrew its military assistance advisory group in July 1967. In response to these events, Pakistan declined to renew the lease on the Peshawar military facility, which ended in 1969. Eventually, United States-Pakistan relations grew measurably weaker as the United States became more deeply involved in Vietnam and as its broader interest in the security of South Asia waned.
Iran, Indonesia, and especially China gave political support to Pakistan during the war, thus suggesting new directions in Pakistan that might translate into support for its security concerns. Most striking was the attitude of the Soviet Union. Its post-Khrushchev leadership, rather than rallying reflexively to India's side, adopted a neutral position and ultimately provided the good offices at Tashkent, which led to the January 1966 Tashkent Declaration that restored the status quo ante.
The aftermath of the 1965 war saw a dramatic shift in Pakistan's security environment. Instead of a single alignment with the United States against China and the Soviet Union, Pakistan found itself cut off from United States military support, on increasingly warm terms with China, and treated equitably by the Soviet Union. Unchanged was the enmity with which India and Pakistan regarded each other over Kashmir. The result was the elaboration of a new security approach, called by Ayub Khan the "triangular tightrope"--a tricky endeavor to maintain good ties with the United States while cultivating China and the Soviet Union. Support from other developing nations was also welcome. None of the new relationships carried the weight of previous ties with the United States, but, taken together, they at least provided Pakistan with a political counterbalance to India.